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ABSTRACT 
Previous research has shown that public opinion has an effect on the voting of Supreme Court 
justices. The research reported here aims to add to this knowledge by looking more specifically 
at cases in which justices seem to vote against their typical ideological leanings. For the 
quantitative portion of this paper, regression analysis established a relationship between public 
opinion and Supreme Court justice votes, in the aggregate and for seven liberal and six 
conservative justices individually. In addition, justices responded less strongly to public opinion 
when the Court was more polarized. For the qualitative portion, Harry Blackmun’s papers were 
analyzed for cases in which he appeared to “switch.” In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (and 
the related Roe v. Wade), he discussed how his vote was guided by his hopes for the future of the 
country, indicating that he was affected by public opinion. Thurgood Marshall, on the other 
hand, has discussed the importance of neutrality on the Court, while Antonin Scalia believes that 
justices should respond even more to the public than they do now. This research has implications 
in American politics because it indicates that the public can affect the highest court in the United 
States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public opinion has an effect on the decision-making processes of Supreme Court justices, 
as previous research in the field has shown (Flemming and Wood 1997; Casillas, Enns, and 
Wohlfarth 2011; Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008). The question I would like to ask is 
whether this effect is strong enough to cause a justice to “switch” and vote against his or her 
ideology and in support of public sentiment. My hypothesis is that the level of public mood can 
have a statistically significant effect on the voting of individual justices on the Supreme Court. 
My motivation for answering this question comes from the 2012 Supreme Court case 
regarding the Affordable Care Act (the ACA). On June 28, the Supreme Court decided, with a 5-
4 vote, to uphold the ACA in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. In this 
decision, Chief Justice Roberts was applauded for analyzing the issue itself without being bound 
by his typical conservative leaning (Anonymous 2012). In the end, he voted with the liberal 
justices to uphold the health care reform act. The fact that his actions attracted so much attention 
indicates that voting against the “party” line is fairly unusual in the modern Supreme Court era. 
This story invites a more general question, a question that motivates my thesis: To what extent 
might public opinion lead a justice to vote in a way that runs counter to his or her ideological 
orientations? This causal relationship is critical because it can change landmark decisions that 
have an effect on national policymaking. This is especially true when the Court has nearly equal 
numbers of liberals and conservatives because one vote switch will change the outcome. Suppose 
Roberts had not voted in the way he did in NFIB vs. Sebelius. The Affordable Care Act, which 
has significantly changed the role government plays in health care, would have been overturned. 
In this thesis, I will explore previous research on the effects of public opinion on the 
Court and how my research will add to it. In the literature review section, I will discuss the 
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evidence behind the effect of public opinion on the voting of Supreme Court justices. In the 
theory section, I will discuss the causal mechanism that I believe explains the effect I will be 
studying. In short, I believe that there is both a direct and an indirect effect of public opinion on 
Supreme Court voting, though the direct effect is stronger. The direct effect is that justices 
strategically respond to public opinion, and the indirect effect is that justices respond to social 
forces much in the same way that the public does, so their views correlate with public opinion 
because of this spurious relationship. 
The methods section will then go on to describe the methods used to test my theory. The 
quantitative portion involved logit analysis with the key independent variable being public 
opinion and the dependent variable being the votes of justices, with controls capturing the effects 
of the ideology of the justice, the involvement of the Solicitor General in the case, amicus curiae 
briefs, the salience of the case, the lower court decision, and whether the case altered precedent. I 
also used a qualitative analysis to better understand the thought processes of justices in making 
decisions. This involved case studies of a set of cases that involved one or more justices voting 
against their typical ideological leanings. I analyzed their notes on each case to determine what 
may have influenced this switch and whether public opinion played a role. 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis will give a more complete 
understanding of how public opinion affects the decision-making of Supreme Court justices. The 
quantitative analysis will hopefully confirm the relationship demonstrated by other researchers to 
exist between public opinion and voting, while the qualitative analysis will provide a closer 
understanding of the thought processes of these justices. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research has shown that public opinion and amicus curiae briefs, which often represent 
factions of the public by expressing the views of interest groups, have an effect on Supreme 
Court decisions (Flemming and Wood 1997; Cassilas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011; Giles, 
Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Epstein and Martin 2010). The assumption in these studies is that 
public opinion and amicus curiae briefs have an effect that is additional to, and not replacing, a 
justice’s innate ideology. So, a very important control in my analysis is the ideology of the 
justices, because research has shown that justices are not always neutral, and they have 
preconceived political views that they bring to the table when making decisions. 
I was interested in the additional effect that public opinion has, controlling for ideology, 
on the Supreme Court justices. There are two different theories to explain the mechanism at play 
that are described in many of the research articles on this topic: the strategic behavior 
explanation, which states that justices pay attention to the public mood for risk of losing 
legitimacy as an institution (a direct relationship), and the attitudinal change explanation, which 
states that the justices tend to vote with the public simply because they are influenced by external 
forces in the same way that the public is (an indirect relationship). Two papers in particular 
(Flemming and Wood 1997; Cassilas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011) found that public opinion 
directly affects the decisions of individual justices, but Giles, Blackstone, and Vining (2008) 
found that the relationship was indirect, supporting the attitudinal change explanation.  
Flemming and Wood (1997) used Stimson’s (1999) policy mood index, a widely 
accepted measure of the “liberalness” of the American public over time and across issue areas, to 
quantify public opinion and applied Spaeth’s (1991) operationalization of the term liberalism to 
assign liberalism scores to justices by term. They then performed a pooled time series cross-
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section analysis, with the individual justice-term as the unit of analysis, to determine the 
relationship between these two variables. They also controlled for the changing composition of 
the Court, the attitudinal inertia of justices, and the strength of judicial ideologies to rule out the 
possibility of a confounding variable. The results demonstrated that public opinion had a direct 
effect on the decisions made by individual members of the Supreme Court. This holds across 
issue areas and is not restricted to only a few justices, but is a widespread phenomenon. Though 
the effect was not measured to be large, it was statistically significant. Another study also found 
that public opinion has a direct effect on Supreme Court voting (Cassilas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 
2011). In that study, they controlled for justices’ attitudinal changes that resulted from the same 
forces that affected public opinion, and still found a statistically significant effect of public 
opinion on the voting of justices. 
Giles, Blackstone, and Vining (2008), on the other hand, have a different view on what is 
causing this relationship between public opinion and justices’ votes. Their study reveals the same 
correlation between public opinion and Supreme Court voting as the other two studies, but 
despite virtually the same experimental design as that in Flemming and Wood, their results 
suggest that there is not a direct relationship, but an indirect one: public opinion does not affect 
decisions, so the causal mechanism is not real, but simply an artifact of the justices being 
influenced by the same forces as the public. This discrepancy is attributed to the two studies 
using different mechanisms to measure public mood. In conclusion, there is no consensus in the 
literature as to the causal mechanism, but many researchers believe that there is a relationship 
between public opinion and voting by Supreme Court justices. Epstein and Martin (2010) also 
showed that there was a correlation between public opinion and justice votes, as these other 
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papers have, but noted the difficulty in discerning between the strategic behavior and the 
attitudinal change models, so did not offer an opinion on this matter. 
I argue in the theory section of this paper that the strategic behavior model, and not the 
attitudinal change model, is the correct one because justices need to listen to public opinion to 
some degree in order to maintain the legitimacy of the institution. In addition, justices are highly 
educated and are unlikely to change their entire ideologies because of public opinion, 
discounting the attitudinal model, but may change a single vote to align with public opinion. 
It is important to understand the role that the ideologies of the justices play in their 
decision-making, in order to control for it in this study. Landes and Posner (2009) performed a 
statistical study that ranked the ideology of justices and looked at their voting patterns to see how 
the two are correlated in both Court of Appeals judges and Supreme Court justices. The 
dependent variable was the ideological classification of votes and the independent variable was a 
measure of the ideology of a justice based on the party of the president who appointed him or 
her, the party make-up of the Senate at the time of his or her confirmation, the appointment year, 
demographic characteristics of the justice, and the ideological make-up of the other justices on 
the Court. The results of the study were that ideology does play a role in decision-making, and 
this effect is stronger in the Supreme Court than in the Court of Appeals. A hypothesis that they 
propose to explain why justices vote ideologically is that they often encounter novel areas of law 
that do not have a clear legal answer yet, so they tend to vote along with their own beliefs in 
these cases. 
These researchers also identified some additional conclusions from their analysis. First, 
they demonstrated that the ideologies of justices are not constant, but change over time. Second, 
they found no evidence of the conformity effect, which states that as the minority gets smaller, 
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people in that minority tend to decide to vote with the majority. They also found no evidence of 
the group-polarization effect, which states that as people of different ideologies are allowed to 
have a discussion, everyone tends to develop more extreme views. They did find evidence of the 
political-polarization effect, but only among Democratic, and not among Republican appointees. 
They observed that the fewer the number of judges appointed by Democratic presidents, the 
more liberally these appointees voted. 
In another study of how ideology affects voting on the Supreme Court, Richards and 
Kritzer (2002) studied jurisprudential regimes and the role they play in justices’ decision-
making. A jurisprudential regime is a set of legal guidelines, often based on precedent, that the 
Court has created to tell them how to decide certain issues. However, their argument is that these 
regimes are often constructed by the justices to further their own policy goals, so even though it 
appears as if the justices are strictly following the law as guided by these jurisprudential regimes, 
these guidelines may in themselves be ideological in nature. This makes the Court more like a 
legislative body than a judicial one. Another indication of this phenomenon is that these regimes 
tend to change with changing justices, and with the climate of the country, so they are not 
completely objective readings of the law. 
In addition to public opinion in the literal sense, amicus curiae briefs are a means of 
alerting Supreme Court justices to the sentiments of the public, although they do not come from 
a representative sample of the population because they are written by particular interest groups or 
other governmental or nongovernmental groups or individuals. Nevertheless, they present views 
of factions of the public and alert the justices to the impact that their decision may have on these 
groups and others. Kearney and Merrill (2000) found that amicus curiae briefs, over the time 
period 1946-1995, moderately affect the Court. To measure this, they first recognized that, in a 
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case with no briefs, petitioners won 60% of the time, respondents won 37% of the time, and a 
mixed result occurred 3% of the time. They then analyzed how these percentages changed when 
briefs were added to one or both sides.  
The results showed that an advantage of a few briefs may help a case, but having too 
many becomes redundant and may even be counterproductive, so the law of diminishing returns 
is seen. They also analyzed the success of amicus briefs based on who was filing them and found 
that the most successful filer was the Solicitor General, the States, and organizations such as the 
ACLU and AFL-CIO. In addition, amicus filers supporting respondents had more success than 
those supporting petitioners. 
While Kearney and Merrill wished to study whether amicus curiae briefs had an effect on 
Supreme Court decisions, Collins (2004) set out to explain why this is true. He proposed two 
theories: the affected groups hypothesis and the information hypothesis. The affected groups 
hypothesis states that an amicus brief is successful because it signals to the Court how many 
people or groups will be affected by their decision, which is relevant to the justices because they 
do not wish to have their decisions rejected by the public for fear of losing legitimacy. The 
information hypothesis states that these briefs provide justices with additional information that 
they may not have known otherwise, which could ultimately change their decision. 
Results showed that amicus participation increases litigation success, though moderately, 
and that this influence is best explained by the information hypothesis. This study, like that of 
Kearney and Merrill, also revealed that the prestige of amicus participants is vital to success in 
the Supreme Court. Unah and Hancock (2006) similarly reached this conclusion after examining 
the role of the ACLU and NAACP in civil rights cases. Among other things, I looked for 
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references to amicus curiae briefs in my qualitative analysis of the justices’ notes to discern what 
effect they had on the decisions. 
The effect of public opinion on Supreme Court decision-making has been studied 
extensively, but the specific class of cases that I studied in my qualitative analysis, in which one 
or more justice switched from his or her typical ideological position, has not been explored. 
Although research indicates that public sentiment affects the Court, does it have a strong enough 
effect to cause a justice to change sides in a seemingly partisan issue?  
This becomes especially interesting when considered in the context of the polarization of 
the Supreme Court. Does the amount of polarization on the Court during a particular term 
determine how responsive the justices are to public opinion? This is a question I considered in 
my analysis. Clark (2009) has measured the ideological polarization of the Supreme Court from 
approximately 1950 to the present. He used the polarization measures developed by Esteban and 
Ray (1994) and applied them to the Supreme Court. The two historical methods of measuring the 
polarization of a population, to either measure the distance between the medians of two parties, 
or to determine the bimodality or high variance of a population, both of which indicate high 
polarization, cannot be applied to the Supreme Court because there are not two distinct groups, 
and there are not enough justices to perform meaningful statistical analysis.  
Esteban and Ray (1994) included characteristics such as homogeneity within a group, 
heterogeneity among groups, and the number of groups to quantitatively measure the 
polarization of groups. Clark used the Segal-Cover (Segal and Cover 1989) and Judicial 
Common Space (Epstein et al. 2007) scores and applied this algorithm to measure polarization 
on the Court. As he explains, “the estimate of polarization is an additive representation of the 
distance from each justice to each other justice, weighted by how many justices fall at any given 
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point” (Clark 2009, 149). The results show that the Supreme Court was particularly polarized 
between about 1970 and 1990, with a relatively constant and lower level of polarization before 
and after this range. It is important to note that polarization is not related to the ideology of the 
Court. The Court could have a median ideology, but be very polarized at the same time. 
Answering the question I am posing, as to whether public opinion is a strong enough 
effect to cause a justice to switch sides, would contribute to the body of knowledge on judicial 
decision-making by identifying the factors that are required to convince a justice to put aside his 
or her partisan leanings on a particular issue. These particular cases, in which one justice 
switches from his or her typical ideological leanings, have significant consequences for national 
policymaking. A change of one vote can change the outcome and have broad implications for the 
American public. 
 
THEORY 
 The literature has proposed two theories to explain why public opinion affects voting on 
the Supreme Court. The first is the strategic behavior explanation, which theorizes that the Court 
directly and deliberately follows public opinion for fear of losing legitimacy as an institution. 
The other theory, the attitudinal change explanation, hypothesizes that justices do not respond 
directly to public opinion, but are influenced by the same social forces that influence public 
opinion, so change their views alongside changes in public opinion. This would indicate a 
spurious relationship between public opinion and voting.  
 I believe that the strategic behavior explanation is the stronger of the two possibilities. If 
the Supreme Court constantly voted in a way contrary to the public’s beliefs or to the beliefs of 
other members of government, it may lose its legitimacy. A good example of a case in which the 
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justices were clearly considering the thoughts of the public is Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
(1991), in which Roe v. Wade was reaffirmed. As stated in the opinion, “only the most 
convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that 
a later decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure and an 
unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first 
instance.” So, the justices that wrote this (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) argued the 
importance of not being swayed by public pressures, but the other justices were clearly 
considering public pressures in their dissenting opinion, or these three justices would not have 
addressed it. 
Part of the Court’s power comes from the fact that the American people trust it as the 
ultimate constitutional decision-making body. Therefore, justices need to consider the possible 
public reaction to a decision, at least to some degree. Second, justices may genuinely feel that it 
is their duty to reflect the mindset of the country by placing the Constitution at the center of 
American life. However, this effect is not as strong as for an elected official, whose purpose is to 
represent his or her constituents.  
The attitudinal change explanation also has some merit, but it is a weaker relationship. 
The theory posits that since justices live in the same society as other citizens, they might change 
their opinions based on the same social forces that affect others’ beliefs. One paper (Casillas 
2011) that attempted to control for this effect defined social forces as the nation’s political 
currents and changes in the economy, inequality, and the crime rate. For example, as 
unemployment increases, the public tends to more strongly support an improvement in the jobs 
situation, and Supreme Court justices may be more likely to make decisions to alleviate this 
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problem. However, this paper found that, even after controlling for these social forces, the effect 
of public opinion on the justices was real. 
 The attitudinal change model is likely a weak relationship at best. World events are not 
likely to sway the opinions of the highly educated Supreme Court justices because their opinions 
are already relatively solidified and based on years of experience and an accumulation of 
knowledge. Although it is unlikely that justices would actually change their opinions due to 
world events, public opinion may be enough to make them vote against their beliefs if they 
perceive possible negative effects on the legitimacy of the institution. 
Even if we assume that social events are changing the opinions of the justices, why is 
public opinion not included in this category of “social forces”? It seems that public opinion 
should influence justices’ opinions just as other social forces do. Thus, these two theories are not 
mutually exclusive. In conclusion, public opinion may convince justices to vote against their 
beliefs on a particular case in order to maintain legitimacy, but neither public opinion nor other 
social forces will actually change their ideology very much. 
My hypothesis is that public opinion has a real effect on how Supreme Court justices 
vote, controlling for their existing ideology. I also hypothesize that their reasoning behind voting 
against their typical ideological lines in particular cases can be gleaned from their notes on those 
cases, and that these notes will reveal that public opinion and amicus curiae briefs have an effect 
on their decision-making process. 
 There are a few things that I will need to control for in this analysis, especially the 
ideology of justices because I am interested in whether they stray from their ideological leanings 
due to public opinion. In addition, research has indicated that a factor that has a significant effect 
on Supreme Court voting is the role that the Solicitor General plays in the case (Kearney and 
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Merrill 2000). Therefore, involvement of the Solicitor General in the case, either as a party or an 
amicus filer, will be controlled for. I will also control for the number of amicus curiae briefs filed 
on either side of the case, the salience of the case, the lower court decision, and whether the 
opinion altered a precedent or declared a law unconstitutional. It is expected that amicus curiae 
briefs will sway the vote in the direction of the brief (or the opposite direction, in the case of too 
many briefs, and thus the law of diminishing returns), and that the lower court decision will sway 
the vote in favor of upholding it. I predict that when the opinion altered precedent or declared a 
law unconstitutional, the decision will more likely be a liberal one because of the progressive 
trend of the country concerning many salient issues. For example, laws are becoming more 
progressive concerning gay marriage and abortion rights. 
By incorporating these variables, I aim to control for the social forces at play, to isolate 
public opinion as a cause and show that the strategic behavior explanation has merit, even if the 
attitudinal change explanation plays a role as well. The difficulty lies in actually controlling for 
these forces. Most researchers have explained that the concept of “social forces” is too broad and 
amorphous to define accurately. One paper (Casillas et al. 2011) that attempted to control for this 
effect defined social forces as the nation’s political currents and changes in the economy, 
inequality, and the crime rate. However, these four factors are only a subset of the “social 
forces,” so this may not be an adequate measure. I tried to get as close as possible to controlling 
all important factors, but the possibility remains that the list is not exhaustive. Even if some 
forces remain uncontrolled, a statistically significant effect in my logit analysis would at least 
show that justices respond to outside forces and align their decisions with public opinion, a 
significant result in itself, even if it cannot be proven that they respond directly to public opinion. 
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METHODS 
Quantitative Analysis 
 Data was collected from a number of sources for this analysis. The variables are 
summarized in Table 1. The sources include the Spaeth Supreme Court Judicial Database 
(Spaeth 1991), the Segal-Cover ideology scores (Segal and Cover 1989), James Stimson’s public 
mood scores (Stimson 1999), Paul Collins’s amicus curiae (Collins 2008; Kearney and Merrill 
2000), his Solicitor General data (Nicholson and Collins 2008), and the Epstein-Segal salience 
measures (Epstein and Segal 2000). The justice-centered data from Spaeth was used because I 
was interested in looking at what influences individual votes. Therefore, each case had multiple 
entries, one for each justice vote, resulting in a total of 75,327 entries. All of the other databases 
were merged with the Spaeth database.  
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Table 1. Variables used in the logistic regression analysis. 
Variable Meaning Coding Source Role 
     
Vote Direction Vote direction 1=liberal, 
0=conservative 
 
Spaeth Dependent 
variable 
Ideology of 
Justice 
Predicted ideology of justice 
prior to position on Supreme 
Court based on newspaper 
editorials 
 
Range from 0 (most 
conservative) to 1 
(most liberal) 
 
Segal-
Cover 
Control 
Public Mood Liberalness of the United 
States public 
Range from 0 (most 
conservative to 100 
(most liberal) 
 
Stimson Independent 
variable 
Solicitor General 
as Liberal Party 
Whether Solicitor General 
was a party on the liberal 
side of the case 
 
0 = no, 1 = yes Collins Control 
Solicitor General 
as Conservative 
Party 
Whether Solicitor General 
was a party on the 
conservative side of the case 
 
0 = no, 1 = yes Collins Control 
Solicitor General, 
Liberal Amicus 
Curiae Brief 
Whether Solicitor General 
wrote an amicus curiae brief 
for the liberal party 
 
0 = no, 1 = yes Collins Control 
Solicitor General, 
Conservative 
Amicus Curiae 
Brief 
 
Whether Solicitor General 
wrote an amicus curiae brief 
for the conservative party 
0 = no, 1 = yes Collins Control 
Altered 
Precedent 
 
Whether the case altered a 
Supreme Court precedent 
0 = no, 1 = yes Collins Control 
Declared 
Unconstitutional 
Whether the decision 
declared a law 
unconstitutional 
 
0 = no, 1 = yes Collins Control 
Number of 
Liberal Amicus 
Curiae Briefs 
The number of amicus curiae 
briefs on the liberal side of 
the case 
 
Count Collins Control 
Number of 
Conservative 
The number of amicus curiae 
briefs on the conservative 
Count Collins Control 
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Amicus Curiae 
Briefs 
 
side of the case 
 
New York Times 
Salience 
Whether the case appeared 
on the front page of the New 
York Times, indicating 
salience 
 
0 = no, 1 = yes Epstein-
Segal 
Control 
Lower Court 
Decision 
Whether the lower court 
represented a liberal decision 
0 = no, 1 = yes Spaeth Control 
 
 Three models were used to analyze these data, and each model was applied to both the 
aggregate dataset and to each justice separately. All models were estimated via logistic 
regression using SPSS, with the vote direction (Dir) as the dependent variable and Public Mood 
as the independent variable of interest. In Model 1, no controls were used, making it a simple 
binary analysis. In Model 2, some of the most important controls – Ideology of Justice, Solicitor 
General Liberal Amicus Curiae Brief, and New York Times Salience – were used. In Model 3, 
all other variables were used as controls.  
 I was also interested in whether the polarization of the Supreme Court has an effect on 
how justices respond to public opinion, so I performed an analysis using the three models for the 
range 1970-1990, the range that Clark (2009) indicated as a particularly polarized era on the 
Court, and compared it the periods before and after this this range. 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
Since I was interested in the behavior of individual justices – not the Court as a whole – 
qualitative analysis of the justices’ notes, available in the Library of Congress, had the potential 
to offer a unique perspective on their thought processes that could not be gained from any other 
source. Justices’ notes, where available, could reveal aspects of their decision-making not 
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obvious from the Court’s formal decisions. I was interested specifically in the cases in which one 
or two justices seemed to switch from their typical ideological leanings in such a way that the 
final vote was swayed in the opposite direction. 
To identify these cases, I used the Spaeth Supreme Court Database and the Segal-Cover 
scores (Segal and Cover 1989), which score each justice’s ideology. Once I had identified the 
ideology of each justice (liberal, conservative, or neutral), I searched for cases with either 5-4 or 
6-3 decisions and looked at the justice votes to identify the cases that met the specified criteria 
(one or two justices “switched” votes to the majority, changing the overall decision). However, I 
discovered through observation of a number of justices’ papers that the only papers that actually 
included notes, and not just the formal opinion, were Harry Blackmun’s papers. He kept very 
extensive notes, and archived all of them, so these were exceptionally helpful. Based on this, I 
decided to look only at cases concerning him because the others did not prove to be useful. 
While analysis on one justice cannot be generalized to the other justices, it still provided an 
interesting case study to examine, and the quantitative portion of this research provides more 
generalized results. To add to this analysis on a more moderate justice, I researched the views of 
Thurgood Marshall (a liberal justice) and Antonin Scalia (a conservative justice) on the 
relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court. While their notes did not prove 
helpful, I found published works written by them on this topic. 
Of the cases in which Harry Blackmun, a conservative based on the Segal-Cover scores, 
voted in a liberal direction in such a way that the decision of the Court was reversed, I chose the 
four that were considered to be salient based on the Epstein and Segal measure of salience 
(Epstein and Segal 2000), which is based on whether the case made the front page of the New 
York Times the day after the decision. I decided to do this because this would better show 
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whether justices are influenced by public opinion. In non-salient cases which the general public 
probably does not know about, the public would not be influencing the justices, whereas salient 
cases are often heavily discussed before the actual vote, so this might have an effect on justice 
votes. However, Unah and Hancock (2006) show that justices respond more strongly to their 
own ideology in salient cases than in non-salient ones. This discrepancy could be a function of 
the type of case. In socially relevant cases, that the public is very aware of, justices may be more 
likely to respond to the public, whereas in cases that are deemed salient (because they appear on 
the front page of the New York Times), but are concerned with more complex issues related to 
the inner workings of the government, the public may not be very aware of the case, and 
therefore the justices may respond more to their own ideology.  
The four cases chosen for the qualitative analysis on Justice Blackmun were: 
 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1972) decided that using public funds for 
private religious schools violated the Establishment Clause. 
 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976) struck down a law in Missouri that placed a 
series of restrictions on abortions. 
 Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City (1978) decided that land use 
regulations to preserve historic landmarks do not constitute a government taking. 
 Maine v. Thiboutot (1980) ruled that the government is obligated to pay for legal fees 
when the appellant is arguing that they have been denied their full welfare payments. 
For each of these cases, I used the finding aids in the Library of Congress to find any information 
in Blackmun’s papers relevant to these cases. 
 
 
21 
 
RESULTS 
Quantitative Analysis 
 Tables 2-4 show the results from the aggregate analysis, using the three models described 
above. Public Mood was shown to have a statistically significant correlation with Vote Direction 
in all three models. This supports my hypothesis that public opinion has an effect on how 
Supreme Court justices vote. In the simple binary analysis (Model 1), an odds ratio of 1.048 was 
seen, which indicates that the odds are 1.048 higher that a justice will vote in a liberal direction 
when the public mood score increases by one (on 100-point scale), a modest but statistically 
significant effect. When three controls are added in (the ideology of the justice, the salience, and 
whether the Solicitor General filed a liberal brief), this odds ratio becomes 1.015, and when all of 
the controls are added in, it becomes 0.991, indicating an opposite effect, that justices tend to 
vote against the public mood, not with it. In other words, the justices were slightly less likely to 
vote with the public when the considerations were included in the analysis.  
 Many of the other variables have statistically significant effects as well. The ideology of 
the justice has a strong positive effect, which is expected because research has shown that 
justices often vote along partisan lines (Landes and Posner 2009; Richards and Kritzker 2002; 
Unah and Hancock 2006). The Solicitor General filing a liberal amicus curiae brief and the total 
number of liberal amicus curiae briefs are positively correlated with a liberal justice vote, as 
expected. The Solicitor General writing a conservative amicus curiae brief and the total number 
of conservative amicus curiae briefs are negatively correlated with a liberal justice vote, also as 
expected. A case that altered precedent or declared a law unconstitutional is positively correlated 
with a liberal vote. The lower court decision is negatively correlated, indicating that the Supreme 
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Court overturns lower court decisions more often than not as a way of correcting the legal errors 
of the lower courts. 
 
 
Table 2. Effect of public mood on Supreme Court votes (Model 1). 
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio 
   
Public Mood 0.047*** 
(0.002) 
 
1.048 
Number of Cases 
65,700 
Percent Correct 
54.7% 
 
 
 
Table 3. Effect of public mood on Supreme Court votes (Model 2). 
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio 
   
Ideology of Justice 1.404*** 
(0.029) 
 
4.069 
Public Mood 0.015*** 
(0.002) 
 
1.015 
 
New York Times Salience 0.184*** 
(0.026) 
 
1.202 
Solicitor General, Liberal Amicus 
Curiae Brief 
0.809*** 
(0.034) 
 
2.246 
Number of Cases 
51,492 
Percent Correct 
61.2% 
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Table 4. Effect of public mood on Supreme Court votes (Model 3). 
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio 
   
Ideology of Justice 1.473*** 
(0.042) 
 
4.364 
Public Mood -0.009*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.991 
Solicitor General as Liberal Party 0.093 
(0.184) 
 
1.098 
Solicitor General as Conservative 
Party 
0.171 
(0.189) 
 
1.186 
Solicitor General, Liberal Amicus 
Curiae Brief 
0.561*** 
(0.044) 
 
1.753 
Solicitor General, Conservative 
Amicus Curiae Brief 
-0.394*** 
(0.045) 
 
0.674 
Altered Precedent 0.187** 
(0.084) 
 
1.205 
Declared Unconstitutional 0.402*** 
(0.021) 
 
1.494 
Number of Liberal Amicus Curiae 
Briefs 
0.092*** 
(0.009) 
 
1.097 
Number of Conservative Amicus 
Curiae Briefs 
-0.068*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.935 
New York Times Salience 0.019 
(0.038) 
 
1.019 
Lower Court Decision -0.584*** 
(0.027) 
 
0.558 
Number of Cases 
26,977 
Percent Correct 
64.6% 
 
 The crux of my analysis concerns the individual justices, so the same models were run on 
each justice individually, and the results are shown in Tables 5-7. Model 1, Stanley Reed, 
William Douglas, Sherman Minton, Earl Warren, William Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron 
White, Arthur Goldberg, William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin 
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Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg all showed statistically significant positive correlations, while Felix 
Frankfurter and John Harlan showed statistically significant negative correlations.  
 In Model 2, Stanley Reed, Earl Warren, Potter Stewart, Byron White, William Rehnquist, 
John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas showed statistically significant positive 
correlations, while Felix Frankfurter showed a statistically significant negative correlation. In 
Model 3, William Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall both showed statistically significant 
correlations, with 95% confidence, between public mood and their vote, though this correlation 
was negative, indicating that they tend to vote against public mood. However, in Models 1 and 2, 
Marshall’s correlation became insignificant and Brennan’s was only significant in Model 1, in 
which he showed a positive correlation. These results are summarized in Table 8, which shows 
only the justices that showed statistical significance, to 95% confidence, in any of the three 
models. 
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Table 5. Effect of public mood on individual justices (Model 1). 
Justice Public Mood Odds Ratio 
Number of 
Cases 
Percent 
Correct 
Hugo O. Black 
 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
0.990 2503 73.8% 
Stanley F. Reed 
 
0.057** 
(0.026) 
1.058 434 55.3% 
Felix Frankfurter 
 
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.973 1082 54.9% 
William O. Douglas 
 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
1.023 3136 81.1% 
Robert H. Jackson 
 
0.025 
(0.048) 
1.026 182 59.9% 
Harold H. Burton 
 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
0.999 671 54.1% 
Tom C. Clark 
 
0.010 
(0.008) 
1.010 1893 55.3% 
Sherman Minton 
 
0.063** 
(0.030) 
1.065 396 52.3% 
Earl Warren 
 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
1.026 2101 75.1% 
John M. Harlan 
 
-0.031** 
(0.024) 
0.969 2190 56.7% 
William J. Brennan, Jr. 
 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
1.014 5090 71.6% 
Charles E. Whittaker 
 
-0.026 
(0.033) 
0.974 641 56.5% 
Potter Stewart 
 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
1.039 3432 55.1% 
Byron White 
 
0.047*** 
(0.006) 
1.048 4704 55.4% 
Arthur J. Goldberg 
 
0.102** 
(0.050) 
1.107 440 76.4% 
Abe Fortas 
 
-0.041 
(0.131) 
0.960 525 72.4% 
Thurgood Marshall 
 
0.002 1.002 3539 72.4% 
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(0.009) 
Warren E. Burger 
 
0.015 
(0.010) 
1.015 2694 66.1% 
Harry A. Blackmun 
 
0.007 
(0.009) 
1.007 3563 51.8% 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
1.020 2385 61.0% 
William H. Rehnquist 
 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
1.035 4303 70.7% 
John Paul Stevens 
 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
1.045 4022 60.8% 
Sandra Day O'Connor 
 
0.030** 
(0.014) 
1.031 2800 62.0% 
Antonin Scalia 
 
0.039** 
(0.016) 
1.040 2535 66.4% 
Anthony Kennedy 
 
0.017 
(0.015) 
1.018 2304 59.9% 
David Souter 
 
0.024 
(0.017) 
1.024 1692 56.7% 
Clarence Thomas 
 
0.032* 
(0.017) 
1.033 1815 70.0% 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
 
0.041** 
(0.017) 
1.041 1600 58.7% 
Stephen G. Breyer 
 
0.027 
(0.016) 
1.027 1488 55.7% 
John G. Roberts 
 
0.057 
(0.055) 
1.058 548 63.0% 
Samuel Alito 
 
0.018 
(0.057) 
1.018 512 66.0% 
Sonia Sotomayor 
 
0.070 
(0.068) 
1.073 238 58.0% 
Elena Kagan 
 
-0.133 
(0.495) 
0.875 127 55.9% 
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Table 6. Effect of public mood on individual justices (Model 2). 
Justice Public Mood Odds Ratio 
Number of 
Cases 
Percent 
Correct 
Hugo O. Black 
 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
0.985 2087 74.1% 
Stanley F. Reed 
 
0.055** 
(0.027) 
1.056 414 56.5% 
Felix Frankfurter 
 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
0.967 993 57.4% 
William O. Douglas 
 
0.010 
(0.011) 
1.010 2645 80.7% 
Robert H. Jackson 
 
0.010 
(0.052) 
1.010 169 63.3% 
Harold H. Burton 
 
-0.012 
(0.019) 
0.988 621 57.5% 
Tom C. Clark 
 
0.013 
(0.009) 
1.013 1617 55.9% 
Sherman Minton 
 
0.059* 
(0.031) 
1.060 376 52.4% 
Earl Warren 
 
0.026** 
(0.013) 
1.027 1743 74.8% 
John M. Harlan 
 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
0.980 1816 57.0% 
William J. Brennan, Jr. 
 
0.006 
(0.007) 
1.007 4410 71..8% 
Charles E. Whittaker 
 
-0.025 
(0.036) 
0.975 560 60.4% 
Potter Stewart 
 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
1.030 2854 53.3% 
Byron White 
 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
1.037 4065 58.0% 
Arthur J. Goldberg 
 
0.088 
(0.054) 
1.092 344 73.3% 
Abe Fortas 
 
-0.089 
(0.152) 
0.915 378 70.4% 
Thurgood Marshall 
 
0.001 1.001 3153 72.8% 
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(0.010) 
Warren E. Burger 
 
0.015 
(0.011) 
1.016 2382 67.3% 
Harry A. Blackmun 
 
0.001 
(0.010) 
1.001 3218 53.3% 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
 
0.015 
(0.012) 
1.015 2117 62.0% 
William H. Rehnquist 
 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
1.032 3676 70.7% 
John Paul Stevens 
 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
1.036 3092 60.0% 
Sandra Day O'Connor 
 
0.020 
(0.015) 
1.021 2338 63.4% 
Antonin Scalia 
 
0.055*** 
(0.021) 
1.057 1606 65.8% 
Anthony Kennedy 
 
0.013 
(0.021) 
1.013 1386 61.9% 
David Souter 
 
-0.041* 
(0.025) 
0.960 1041 59.3% 
Clarence Thomas 
 
0.075** 
(0.029) 
1.078 926 68.6% 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
 
0.044 
(0.057) 
1.045 726 59.4% 
Stephen G. Breyer 
 
0.081 
(0.071) 
1.085 634 57.1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 7. Effect of public mood on individual justices (Model 3). 
Justice Public Mood Odds Ratio 
Number of 
Cases 
Percent 
Correct 
Hugo O. Black 
 
-0.004 
(0.018) 
0.996 995 71.8% 
Stanley F. Reed 
 
0.095 
(0.081) 
1.101 140 57.1% 
Felix Frankfurter 
 
-0.037* 
(0.022) 
0.964 384 64.3% 
William O. Douglas 
 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
0.966 1319 84.1% 
Robert H. Jackson 
 
0.591 
(0.989) 
1.807 39 72.9% 
Harold H. Burton 
 
0.001 
(0.047) 
1.001 220 59.1% 
Tom C. Clark 
 
-0.019 
(0.018) 
0.981 745 62.1% 
Sherman Minton 
 
0.115 
(0.107) 
1.122 125 61.6% 
Earl Warren 
 
0.004 
(0.020) 
1.004 860 76.4% 
John M. Harlan 
 
-0.018 
(0.022) 
0.982 920 60.9% 
William J. Brennan, Jr. 
 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.974 2434 74.3% 
Charles E. Whittaker 
 
0.047 
(0.058) 
1.048 249 65.5% 
Potter Stewart 
 
0.003 
(0.011) 
1.003 1553 63.4% 
Byron White 
 
0.001 
(0.010) 
1.001 2333 64.0% 
Arthur J. Goldberg 
 
0.149 
(0.104) 
1.160 189 88.4% 
Abe Fortas 
 
0.148 
(0.233) 
1.159 207 77.3% 
Thurgood Marshall 
 
-0.029** 0.971 1848 75.8% 
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(0.014) 
Warren E. Burger 
 
-0.016 
(0.016) 
0.985 1348 70.6% 
Harry A. Blackmun 
 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
0.980 1852 63.6% 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
 
-0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.970 1212 67.3% 
William H. Rehnquist 
 
0.012 
(0.015) 
1.012 2003 71.9% 
John Paul Stevens 
 
0.026 
(0.017) 
1.026 1688 63.4% 
Sandra Day O'Connor 
 
0.021 
(0.021) 
1.022 1267 65.8% 
Antonin Scalia 
 
0.040 
(0.030) 
1.041 846 68.0% 
Anthony Kennedy 
 
-0.003 
(0.030) 
0.997 708 65.1% 
David Souter 
 
-0.041 
(0.036) 
0.960 493 66.5% 
Clarence Thomas 
 
0.072* 
(0.041) 
1.075 421 69.4% 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
 
-0.066 
(0.089) 
0.936 314 62.7% 
Stephen G. Breyer 
 
0.025 
(0.138) 
1.025 265 66.4% 
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Table 8. Significant (95%) correlations between public mood and justice vote. 
Justice Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Segal-Cover 
Score 
     
Stanley Reed 
 
Positive Positive  0.725 
Felix Frankfurter 
 
Negative Negative  0.665 
William Douglas 
 
Positive   0.730 
Sherman Minton 
 
Positive   0.720 
Earl Warren 
 
Positive Positive  0.750 
John Harlan 
 
Negative   0.875 
William Brennan, Jr. 
 
Positive  Negative 1.000 
Potter Stewart 
 
Positive Positive  0.750 
Byron White 
 
Positive Positive  0.500 
Arthur Goldberg 
 
Positive   0.750 
Thurgood Marshall 
 
  Negative 1.000 
William Rehnquist 
 
Positive Positive  0.045 
John Paul Stevens 
 
Positive Positive  0.250 
Sandra Day O’Connor 
 
Positive   0.415 
Antonin Scalia 
 
Positive Positive  0.000 
Clarence Thomas 
 
 Positive  0.160 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
 
Positive   0.680 
 
 Table 8 provides a summary of the justice-specific analysis. Correlations with 90% 
confidence, though noted in Tables 4-7, were not included. A large number of justices show 
positive correlations in Model 1, but this number decreases in Model 2 and disappears in Model 
3. The justice that stands out is Felix Frankfurter, who is the only one with two negative 
correlations. This indicates that he tends to respond to public mood by moving farther from it. 
 Perhaps the most interesting part of this table is that the only two justices with maximum 
liberalness scores (1.000) –William Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall – were the only two that 
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showed a negative correlation (in fact, they were the only ones that showed a correlation at all) in 
Model 3. Both served on two relatively moderate courts (the Warren and Burger Courts) before 
serving on a very conservative Court (the Rehnquist Court), so I split up their cases into two 
categories: those before the Rehnquist Court and those during the Rehnquist Court, and the 
results are shown in Table 9. Before the Rehnquist Court, both justices show a highly significant 
(p < 0.01) negative correlation, which indicates that these liberal titans were less likely to be 
influenced by public mood. The relationship became statistically insignificant during the 
Rehnquist court. However, both show relatively large positive correlations, so this indicates that 
there could have been a change in the voting of these two justices as the Rehnquist Court began. 
 
Table 9. Close analysis of Brennan and Marshall by Court era (Model 3). 
Justice Public Mood Odds Ratio 
Number of 
Cases 
Percent 
Correct 
 
William Brennan, Jr. 
(before Rehnquist Court) 
 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.969 2187 74.4% 
 
William Brennan, Jr. 
(Rehnquist Court) 
 
0.228 
(0.894) 
1.256 247 78.5% 
 
Thurgood Marshall  
(before Rehnquist Court) 
 
-0.048*** 
(0.015) 
0.953 1530 74.6% 
 
Thurgood Marshall 
(Rehnquist Court) 
 
1.084 
(0.925) 
2.955 318 81.8% 
 
 To study whether polarization of the Supreme Court has an effect on this relationship 
between public opinion and justice votes, I analyzed the particularly polarized era (1970-1990), 
defined by Clark (2009) and compared it to all other dates. The results are shown below, in Table 
10. 
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Table 10. Effect of polarization on relationship between public mood and justice votes. 
Justice Public Mood Odds Ratio 
Number of 
Cases 
Percent 
Correct 
 
1970-1990 
(Model 1) 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
1.025 28683 52.1% 
 
All other years 
(Model 1) 
0.053*** 
(0.002) 
1.054 37017 56.6% 
 
1970-1990 
(Model 2) 
 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
1.010 25879 61.9% 
 
All other years 
(Model 2) 
 
0.020*** 
(0.003) 
1.020 25613 60.9% 
 
1970-1990 
(Model 3) 
 
1.660*** 
(0.051) 
5.260 14983 65.4% 
 
All other years 
(Model 3) 
 
0.003 
(0.005) 
1.003 11994 64.2% 
 
 This shows that the justices seem to respond less strongly to public opinion when the 
Court is more polarized (1970-1990). In Models 1 and 2, all relationships are highly statistically 
significant (p < 0.01) and the odds ratio is smaller for the specified date range than for all other 
years. In Model 3, only one of the results was statistically significant, so a comparison cannot be 
made. 
 
Qualitative 
Justice Harry Blackmun 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1972) 
 The legislation in question in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (413 U.S. 756, 
1972) consisted of a series of amendments to New York State’s education and tax laws that 
provided funding to help with the maintenance of private schools that served a high 
concentration of low-income students. It also provided partial tuition reimbursement for families 
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below a certain income level and tax relief to parents failing to quality for tuition reimbursement. 
The issue that called law into question was that 85% of these private schools were church-
affiliated. Warren Burger and William Rehnquist, both conservative justices, and Byron White, a 
moderate justice, voted to uphold the law. The liberals on the court – William Douglas, William 
Brennan, Potter Stewart, and Thurgood Marshall – voted to strike down the law. Harry 
Blackmun and Lewis Powell, both conservatives, joined the liberals in voting against the law.  
 The majority opinion, written by Lewis Powell, stated that “the maintenance and repair 
provisions of the New York statute violate the Establishment Clause because their inevitable 
effect is to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools.” The tuition 
reimbursements and income tax benefits similarly violated the Establishment Clause, the opinion 
said. As it explained, the law was “not sufficiently restricted to assure that it [would] not have 
the impermissible effect of advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools.” An amicus 
curiae brief from the National Education Association and the Horace Mann League shows that 
over 80% of non-public school attendance in New York from 1971-1972 was Roman Catholic, 
so these provisions would disproportionately support one religion over others (Blackmun Papers, 
Box 169). 
 A bench memo found in Blackmun’s papers (Box 169) nicely outlined the issues in the 
case and the amicus curiae briefs that may have influenced his, and the other justices’ decisions. 
The first provision involves the state grants for maintenance. One brief for Nyquist, the 
Commissioner of Education of New York who was in favor of the law, argued that there are 
other federal programs that give aid to both public and private schools, so this aid should be 
allowed. The response written by the clerk stated that since this aid is going only to private 
schools, it violates the Establishment Clause. The brief also argued that it is part of a state’s 
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police power to protect the welfare of its citizens, but the response to this was that the First 
Amendment presents a more stringent standard than the police powers.  
 An amicus brief filed for the Committee for Public Education, which was trying to strike 
down the law, argued that other laws that provide aid directly to the families of private school 
students have been upheld, but that this law is different because it directly supports the schools 
themselves. Since religion is a large part of how these schools are run, and the New York State 
Constitution forbids taxes to be used to maintain sectarian schools, this law must be 
unconstitutional. 
 The second provision in question is the one that provides tuition reimbursement. One 
brief in favor of the law argues that the purpose of these schools is to educate, not to promote 
religion, but the clerk notes that there is no support to back this up. The brief also states that the 
low-income feature of the law reflects it secular purpose, and argues that this is public welfare 
legislation, which the Court cannot rule on (Dandridge v. Williams). The clerk’s response to this 
is that the Dandridge case is irrelevant and that the whole brief “approaches incompetence!” 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 169). Another brief argues that without this law, it is harder for people 
of the lower income bracket to choose where their children go to school, so “the State is 
depriving the poor of due process and free exercise of religion” (Blackmun Papers, Box 169). A 
third brief states that since only 50% of the total tuition bill can be reimbursed with this law, and 
that less than 50% of tuition is dedicated to religious use, religion is not further by this aid. One 
brief was filed in favor of striking down the law on the basis of the tuition reimbursement 
provision. It argued, in response to the above brief, that the fact that reimbursement is limited to 
50% of tuition does not guarantee that the money will not be used for religious purposes. 
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 The third issue in question is the tax credit for families failing to qualify for tuition 
reimbursement. One brief, in favor of the law, states that tax exclusion has a secular purpose, to 
give relief to citizens who bear their share in supporting public schools, but decide not to take 
advantage of the school system. It also argues that tax exemption creates only minimal 
involvement between church and state and that the relationship affected by this law is between 
the state and the individual, not between the state and the church. States traditionally have broad 
powers in taxation, it argues, so this law should be upheld. A second brief states that the money, 
in the form of tax credits, is going to the parents, and not to the school. The clerk’s response to 
this is that the parents are not being exempted more than the cost of tuition, so whatever credit 
they get will in turn go to the school. 
 A brief in favor of striking down the law argues that “there is no constitutional difference 
between direct grants to parents for tuition and exclusions or tax credits which achieve the same 
purpose” (Blackmun Papers, Box 169), and since the argument has already been made that the 
tuition grants are unconstitutional, so are the tax credits. While it is unclear who wrote this bench 
memo, because it is simply signed “RPB,” he or she concluded with advising that all three 
provisions of the law be struck down. It is likely that the combination of the briefs described 
above influenced Blackmun’s decision to strike down the law. 
 
 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 
 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth started when two physicians who performed abortions in 
Missouri challenged a Missouri statute restricting abortions (Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 
428 U.S. 52, 1976). The District Court upheld all provisions except the one that stated that if a 
physician did not try to save the life of the fetus, he or she was guilty of manslaughter, on the 
grounds that it was too broad because it did not exclude the period of time before viability. When 
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the case reached the Supreme Court, all of the controversial provisions, which resulted in making 
it more difficult to perform an abortion, were struck down. The liberals on the Court at the time – 
William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Potter Stewart – voted with the majority. Two 
moderate conservatives, Harry Blackmun and Lewis Powell, joined the majority. The three 
remaining conservatives – Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and John Paul Stevens – voted 
with the minority, along with the moderate Byron White. Blackmun wrote the lead plurality 
opinion. The provisions under attack and the Court’s opinions on them are summarized in Table 
11 below. 
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Table 11. Summary of opinion on provisions of Missouri statute.  
Provision Specifications Opinion 
 
2(2) 
 
Defined viability as the stage where an 
unborn child could survive outside the 
womb by either natural or artificial 
means. 
 
 
This does not conflict with Roe v. Wade’s 
definition, so it can stand. 
3(2) Required that in the first twelve weeks 
of pregnancy, a woman must consent 
freely in writing to an abortion. 
 
Upheld. 
3(3) Required that in the first twelve weeks, 
a woman needs written consent from 
her spouse, unless the woman’s life is 
in danger. 
 
Roe v. Wade stated that the state cannot 
interfere until viability, so it is 
unconstitutional to give the spouse a veto 
power that even the state does not have. 
3(4) Requires that in first twelve weeks, 
parental permission is required if 
patient is under18. 
 
Unconstitutional for the same reasons as 
3(3), above. 
6(1) States that if a physician does not try to 
save the fetus’s life, he or she is guilty 
of manslaughter. 
 
Struck down. 
7 States that if the baby survives, it 
belongs to the state (parents have no 
parental rights). 
 
Declines to decide because appellants 
have no standing to challenge. 
9 States that after twelve weeks, saline 
amniocentesis cannot be performed. 
This is unconstitutional because it 
prohibits the safest means of abortion for 
the mother. 
10/11 Facilities performing abortions have 
specific reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements. 
 
Upheld, as long as it is not used to 
require spousal or parental consent. 
 
 The amicus curiae briefs for Planned Parenthood were filed by the Center for 
Constitutional Rights and the Women’s Law Project and the Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America. The briefs filed for John Danforth, the Attorney General of Missouri, were the United 
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States Catholic Conference, Americans United for Life, Lawyers and Social Workers for Life, 
D.C. Right to Life, and Missouri Nurses for Life. 
 In Blackmun’s notes on this case, I found some questions that he posed to himself to help 
him tease out the specifics of the issue. They were 1) “What Missouri statute, other than this one, 
requires a written consent for surgery?” 2) “Does Missouri impose recordkeeping requirements, 
like those for abortion, with respect to other surgical procedures?” 3) “If the spouses are 
separated, is the husband’s consent still required for the abortion?” 4) “Is the decision to 
conceive always jointly made?” He also wrote that he was “just so pleased that we had this 
argued.” 
 While his notes were not incredibly informative in terms of understanding his decision-
making process on this case, Becoming Justice Blackmun addressed it more directly. In this 
book, Linda Greenhouse explains that “Blackmun wrote that while a ‘devoted and protective 
husband’ had an obvious interest in his wife’s pregnancy, ‘Inasmuch as it is the woman who 
physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected  by the 
pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor’” (Greenhouse 2005, 110). 
Blackmun was clearly an advocate for women’s rights, as also described in The Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun Oral History Project (Koh 1995). When asked, “Do you think that at this point you 
were starting to refocus your examination in the abortion context to the rights of the women over 
the rights of the doctors?” Blackmun responded, “Well, I think the rights of the women always 
were involved, and in the Roe against Wade too, even though it was hooked there with the 
attending physician’s approval. But her rights are central, and I think it came out in greater relief 
in this case” (Koh 1995, 269). 
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 Since many of the sources about Planned Parenthood v. Danforth cite Roe v. Wade, I 
decided to research this case as well. In 1973, the Supreme Court voted 7-2 to overturn a Texas 
law that prohibited abortion except to save a mother’s life. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority 
opinion, arguing that the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy. The ruling defined the extent a state is allowed to regulate in each stage of 
pregnancy. In the first trimester, the state may not interfere. After the first trimester, but before 
viability, the state may only regulate in order to protect maternal health. After viability, the state 
may prohibit abortions altogether, except in the case where the mother’s life is at risk. 
 My research on this case revealed interesting snapshots of Blackmun’s decision-making 
processes – what he is influenced by, the factors he considers important in making decisions, and 
the process by which he approaches a case. He saved the clipping of an article written by Austin 
C. Wehrwein about his decision in Roe v. Wade that quoted him as saying that one’s approach 
reflects “one’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human 
existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitude toward life and family and their values, and the 
moral standards one establishes to seek and observe” (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 11). 
 Blackmun has always been a champion of women’s rights, which likely had a significant 
effect on his decision in Roe v. Wade. It was pointed out by his interviewer in the Oral History 
Project that Blackmun had hired more women than any other justice at the time, to which 
Blackmun responded that he believed in the equality of opportunity (Koh 1995, 284). But he is 
sure to assert that he is not being unfairly influenced by his wife and daughters when he says, “A 
lot of people think that because we have three daughters, and Mrs. Blackmun’s in the picture, 
and we even had a female dog at the time, that I was overwhelmed by the feminist approach to 
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these cases. But Dottie, Mrs. Blackmun, and I seldom discuss issues” (Koh 1995, 199). In fact, 
he explains that his wife and daughters did not lobby him at all about this particular case. 
 So, why did a seemingly conservative justice vote in a liberal way in such a landmark 
case? Some have speculated that Blackmun became more liberal over the course of his career. In 
response to this, Blackmun said, “I haven’t changed, the court has changed under me, which to 
some degree is a correct observation, I think. It has become more conservative than it used to 
be… I think over the years I’ve been consistent. I don’t think of a case where I would have 
changed my vote” (Koh 1995, 16). In order to really understand why he voted in the way that he 
did in Roe v. Wade, we need to look at the development of the case. 
 Blackmun conducted a lot of research prior to reaching a decision in Roe v. Wade. He 
spent a summer in medical libraries researching abortion and the Hippocratic Oath (Koh 1995). 
As part of this research, he spent two weeks in the Mayo Clinic’s medical library, but assures 
that he was not inappropriately influenced by those in the clinic because only the librarian knew 
what he was doing there (Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1). He explains, “I found a 
definite answer, I concluded, in a monograph written in 1943 by a Johns Hopkins physician 
named Edelstein… It convinced me that the Hippocratic Oath was localized and parochial and a 
happy tradition but was no barrier professionally or legally to the prescription of a contraceptive” 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1, 26). 
 The interviewer of the Oral History Project commented that the first draft of the opinion 
was based on questions of vagueness, but the second opinion, after his summer of research, was 
based on history and the right to privacy. He asked Blackmun, “Do you feel that your summer 
research bolstered your view that you really ought to get to the merits of the right-to-privacy 
question?” and Blackmun responded that this research “gave me a chance to get deeply into the 
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subject. Of course, it fortified my own views” (Koh 1995, 197). In addition to the Hippocratic 
Oath, his research spanned the ancient attitudes of the Roman Catholic Church, common law, 
English statutory law, attitudes of the American Medical Association, the American Public 
Health Association, and the American Bar Association (Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1).  
 The logistics of the case itself were complicated, and the votes of the justices were never 
certain. At the time of the original arguments, the Court only have seven justices, so Blackmun 
asked that it be reargued when there was a full Court, because of the significance of the case 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1). He also thought the Hippocratic Oath needed to be 
looked at more closely, which prompted his summer research. William Douglas did not want the 
case reargued because he was afraid that the decision would change to an affirmation of the law, 
as the two additional voting justices would be Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, who were 
on the Court at the time but could not vote because they had not been there for the arguments. 
This was described in an article from the Washington Post in July 1972 titled “Move by Burger 
May Shift Court’s Stand on Abortion,” that Blackmun saved with his papers (Blackmun Papers, 
Box 151, Folder 11). Another article clipping in Blackmun’s papers, “Friction Reported in 
Supreme Court Abortion Ruling” from the Evening Star in July 1972 predicted a similar 
outcome.  
 In terms of the specifics of the opinion, it was Thurgood Marshall’s idea to have the 
period between the first trimester and viability be regulated only to preserve the mother’s health. 
Blackmun considered moving this cut-off point from the first trimester to the point of viability, 
but did not want to make the change for fear of alienating other justices that had originally 
agreed with his opinion (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 4). Blackmun was never as sure of 
his opinion as it may appear from the final result. Sarah Weddington, an oralist making an 
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argument in the case, originally counted him as a vote to uphold the law, as explained by the 
interviewer of the Oral History Project (Koh 1995). Blackmun’s reply was, “I wasn’t as firm as 
Brennan was, for example, and certainly not as firm as White and Rehnquist on the other side” 
(Koh 1995, 194). Hugo Black warned Blackmun to not let his uncertainties show through in his 
opinion, but to make his arguments seem like common sense, but Blackmun admitted that this 
was difficult given the gravity and emotional nature of the decision. 
 Despite Blackmun’s heavy involvement in this case, including the extensive research he 
conducted, he states that he was surprised that the Chief Justice asked him to write the opinion 
(Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1). He tried to explain this by looking at each of the other 
eligible justices. He stated that William Douglas wanted to write it, but he was possibly going to 
be impeached for carelessness. It would be too much of a burden for Brennan to write because he 
identified as Roman Catholic. He thought it would be uncomfortable for Thurgood Marshall to 
write it because he was the only African-American, though he did not elaborate on this point, so 
it is hard to discern what he meant by this. Since Blackmun had been legal counsel at the Mayo 
Clinic before becoming a judge, he knew the most about medical law at the time, and thus was 
chosen to write the opinion. 
 Justice Blackmun seems to, in addition to looking at the specific legal issues involved in 
a case, consider the direction the country will go in with one decision or another. He explains, “I 
think that Roe and Doe are examples of the Court’s commitment to protecting against the 
tyranny of an assumed majority. I think the decisions are distinctly in line with the expanding 
concepts of privacy” (Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1, 92-93). He defends his decision 
emphatically by saying, “I thought that Roe against Wade was correct when it was decided in 
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1973 and I think it is correct today. It was a decision that had to be made if the country was to go 
down the road toward the complete emancipation of women. Period” (Koh 1995, 25). 
 I looked through the papers he saved from this case to try to understand the outside 
influences that might have played a role in his decision. He acknowledges these forces by saying, 
“All this has been a bit of an experience for me, personally. I never thought that I would be 
standing against the combined might of the Roman Catholic Church, the Mormon Church, 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue, and other forces, with all of their political power and force. It taught me 
again that the Federal Bench is no place to win a popularity contest” (Blackmun Papers, Box 
1491, Folder 1, 90). He saved some newspaper clippings, including the article by Wehrwein 
described above. In this article, the author challenges that if we consider a fetus to be a person, 
the exception that most states have for abortion in order to save the mother’s life is contrary 
because the fetus and mother are both people (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 11). In an 
article by Avi Cooper from the Post-Bulletin of Rochester, Minnesota in October 1972, Potter 
Stewart is described as having said that one only gains constitutional rights once they are born, 
countering Wehrwein’s article. 
 He also saved clippings of Letters to the Editor from an unspecified publication. One, 
written by R.L. Merck of 710 3
rd
 Avenue SE argues that trying to decide when a fetus becomes a 
person is like trying to play God. Another, written by Reverend Donald E. West, the pastor of 
Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church in Plainview, Minnesota, praises St. Mary’s Hospital for 
not agreeing to perform abortions on the grounds that all unborn children have the right to live. 
The fact that Blackmun saved all of these article clippings, from both sides of the argument, 
indicates that they had some significance to him.  
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 In his speech at the Aspen Institute on the history of the Roe v. Wade decision, Blackmun 
describes the cases that played a role in his decision (Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1). 
First was Griswold v. Connecticut, which overturned a law that forbade the use of 
contraceptives. The conclusion here was that this law violated the marital privacy which is 
included within the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, which means that these rights include more 
than those that are specifically outlined. As Blackmun describes, “The Fifth Amendment in its 
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may 
not force him to surrender to his detriment” (Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1, 9-10). The 
second case is Eisenstadt v. Baird, which overturned a Massachusetts law that forbade anyone 
except a physician to give contraception to anyone except a married person. The ruling was that 
this violated equal protection by treating married and unmarried persons differently. 
 Blackmun has clearly thought deeply about this case even well past its conclusion, 
through his speeches and writings. He received a good amount of negative mail about his 
decision, but he tries to explain that he tried to make his decision on a constitutional basis, not a 
moral one. He is still firm in his opinion, saying that “I repeat that I make no apology whatsoever 
for the scholarship in the opinions and for the results reached. I think they were right in 1973. I 
think they are right today. Others disagree… They are, I believe, a watershed on the road we 
must travel toward the emancipation of women” (Blackmun Papers, Box 1491, Folder 1, 96). He 
does not approve of the term some people have associated with the Roe decision, “abortion on 
demand,” because he asserts that the physician’s advice should always be an important aspect, 
and that the physician and the patient have to work together to reach a decision (Koh 1995). 
 He is also concerned that the Court is moving in the wrong direction in terms of the 
abortion debate. In a letter he wrote to Thurgood Marshall, he explains, “I need not say how 
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disappointed I’ve been in perceiving the Court’s noticeable withdrawal in recent cases from the 
more positive position of Roe, Doe, and Danforth. I fear the forces of emotion and professed 
morality are winning some battles, that the real world continues to exist out there, and I earnestly 
hope that the war will not be lost despite these adverse battles” (Koh 1995, 273). Blackmun 
believed that “the Court was increasingly being divided into a group of justices who could relate 
to the real world and a group that couldn’t” (Koh 1995, 273).  
 
Pennsylvania Central Transportation Company v. New York City 
 Penn Central v. New York dealt with the government’s ability to preserve certain areas as 
historic landmarks. Grand Central Station was owned by Penn Central, who wanted to build an 
office building on top of the station because the station was not being used as much as it used to 
be, so it was losing money. The government of New York City stated that this office building 
was not allowed because Grand Central is a historic landmark that cannot be altered in certain 
ways. Penn Central claimed that this was a taking because the government was in essence 
claiming the airspace above the building. All of the liberal justices at the time – William 
Brennan, Potter Stewart, and Thurgood Marshall – and the moderate justice, Byron White, voted 
in favor of New York. Two conservatives, Harry Blackmun and Lewis Powell, joined them, 
while the rest of the conservatives – William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, and Warren Burger – 
voted in favor of Penn Central. 
 The majority opinion was that this did not constitute a taking because it is similar in 
principle to any other land use regulation (Penn Central v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 1977). It 
does not completely deprive owners of any economic use, so cannot be classified as a taking. 
The New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law protects the city’s right to regulate any 
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changes to the exterior of a historic landmark. The owner of the station argued that this 
regulation violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by depriving them of property without 
due process of law. However, the government may enact laws that adversely affect economic 
interests if the purpose is for the general welfare, without these laws being considered a taking. 
The appellants go on to argue that this law is discriminatory because it targets only one owner, 
whereas broad zoning laws are permitted. The response was that this is irrelevant to the 
classification of a law as a taking. The justices also assert in the opinion that the decision is not 
as drastic as the owners say, because it is not that no building is allowed on top of Penn Central 
Station, just not this particular plan. The city of New York may have approved it if it was 
designed differently. 
 The amicus curiae briefs for the appellants (Penn Central) were written by the Pacific 
Legal Foundation and the Real Estate Board of New York. The briefs written for the appellees in 
favor of preserving the building were the Solicitor General (who also participated in the oral 
argument), the State of New York, California, the Committee to Save Grand Central Station, and 
the National Trust for Historic Preservation. In his notes (Blackmun Papers, Box 273, Folder 10), 
Blackmun posed a number of questions to himself in deciding the case: 1) “Does the designation 
as a historic landmark automatically result in tax exemption?” 2) Do the appellants not concede 
that the features of Grand Central terminal justify its designation as an historic landmark?” 3) 
“Does the Penn Central feel that the only way to preserve historic buildings is through eminent 
domain?” 4) Is the railroad’s claim for compensation for a ‘temporary taking’ properly before us 
inasmuch as the trial court stated he was reserving judgment on that question?” 5) “What if the 
Penn Central had sold rather than leased its air rights and had done so before the landmark 
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statute was passed. Is there not then a taking of all the value of his air rights?” Blackmun found 
this to be a complex case, and he wrote in his notes, “this is not an easy one, for it has emotion.” 
 
Maine v. Thiboutot 
 The 1980 case Maine v. Thiboutot involved Lionel and Joline Thiboutot, who had eight 
children, three of which were Lionel’s from a previous marriage (Blackmun Papers, Box 316). 
The Maine Department of Human Services told him that the AFDC (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) would provide funds for three of the children, but not the other five, even 
though they were legally obligated to provide for all of them. The Thiboutots argued that the 
State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human Resources were depriving them of the welfare 
benefits guaranteed by the Social Security Act. The Maine Superior Court ruled that they ought 
to be paid benefits for all eight children, but that they could not be compensated for attorney fees 
under the state law. However, the federal government may be able to pay these fees, so they took 
the case to the Supreme Court. 
 The relevant statute is Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states that “every person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, 
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.” In other words, if a state deprives a person of their rights outlined by the 
federal government, the state is liable to that person. There are two issues to be considered in this 
case: 1) whether this statute includes legislative laws, and not just Constitutional requirements, 
and 2) whether legal fees may be awarded in such a case. 
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 The ruling from the Supreme Court was that this family not only needed to be paid for all 
eight children, but should be compensated for legal fees. The liberals on the Court at the time – 
William Brennan, Potter Stewart, and Thurgood Marshall – as well as the moderate Byron 
White, voted with the majority. Two conservatives, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens 
joined them. The remaining conservatives – Warren Burger, Lewis Powell, and William 
Rehnquist – voted against the Thiboutots. The majority opinion was that “given that the 
Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase ‘and laws,’ the plain language of the statute 
embraces respondents’ claim… the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal 
statutory as well as constitutional law” (Blackmun Papers, Box 316). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 
1988 (the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976), provides that “attorney’s fees may 
be awarded to the prevailing party (other than the United States) in ‘any action… to enforce’ a 
provision of § 1983, inter alia, and which makes no exception for statutory § 1983 actions – 
authorizes the award of attorney’s fees in such actions.” Blackmun did not have any additional 
notes in this case to help explain his decision-making process. 
  
Thurgood Marshall 
 While Thurgood Marshall’s papers did not have enough material to perform the same sort 
of analysis as with Harry Blackmun, some of his published writings give us a sense of his take 
on the issue of public opinion and the Supreme Court. One in particular, a speech he gave at the 
Second Circuit Judicial Conference on May 8, 1981 (Tushnet 2001), directly addresses this issue. 
He explains, “Our [the justices] central function is to act as neutral arbiters of disputes that arise 
under the law. To this end, we bind ourselves through our own code of ethics to avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety or partiality. We must handle the cases that come before us without 
50 
 
regard for what result might meet with public approval. We must decide each case in accordance 
with the law” (Tushnet 2001, 189). So, he believes in a strict reading of the law, not decision-
making based on how the public feels. However, he acknowledges that this impartiality is never 
complete, and that all justices come into their positions with biases. He cites certain cases – Dred 
Scott, Plessy, Korematsu and the trial proceedings in Moore v. Dempsey – as shameful examples 
in which the justices heavily relied on the mob mentality of the public in making their decisions. 
 Marshall goes on to explain why the impartiality of the Supreme Court is so important. 
The legislature and executive branches of the U.S. government are elected by the people, so they 
are designed to be accountable to public opinion. The third branch, the judiciary, was created to 
check the other two and prevent tyranny of the majority. It was designed to be uninfluenced by 
public opinion, because the justices are not elected by the people. If the judiciary begins 
responding to public opinion, they are essentially becoming another legislative body, Marshall 
fears. However, many judges today are criticized for their neutrality, in that getting a case 
through the justice system is a lengthy process. This mentality concerns Marshall because he 
believes that cases should not be quickly handled, but correctly handled, in order to protect the 
innocent. He says, “when I was in law school, I was taught not that judges were there to see the 
defendant convicted and punished in every case, but that they were there to see justice done in 
every case” (Marshall quoted in Tushnet 2001, 188).  
 Marshall goes on to explain that if justices support certain policies that the public 
supports, they may gain public approval in the short-run, but in the long-run, they will lose 
credibility as a neutral authority. “We must never forget that the only real source of power that 
we as judges can tap is the respect of the people. We will command that respect only as long as 
we strive for neutrality” (Marshall quoted in Tushnet 2001, 189). Marshall seems to take this rule 
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to heart because his voting behavior showed no correlation with public opinion in Models 1 and 
2, but a somewhat negative correlation in Model 3. 
 
Antonin Scalia 
 Antonin Scalia presents another view, that public opinion does not have much of an 
effect on the justices because they are out of touch with the public, and do not actually 
understand what they are thinking. He explains, “We come from the top cream of society and 
then we are set off in our marble palace. I don’t know what the most profoundly held beliefs of 
the American people are. I don’t go to the neighborhood pub and raise a glass with Joe Six-pack. 
I haven’t done that in quite a while” (Scalia quoted in Reed 1996). When considering cases in 
which the Supreme Court was asked to decide on issues of right to privacy or to an abortion, 
Scalia questions, “Why would you leave that to nine lawyers, for heaven’s sake? It’s better to let 
the people decide.” He expands this view by proposing that all social issues be decided through 
constitutional amendments or state or federal laws, not through the judicial system. 
 This indicates that Scalia believes that ideally, the justices should be more in tune with 
the public, but since that is often hard to attain because of their elevated position in society, he 
believes that social issues should be decided through legislative means. However, the 
quantitative analysis in this paper suggests that the justices – including Scalia, who showed a 
positive correlation in Models 1 and 2 – do respond to public opinion. This fact would weaken 
his own argument, though he could still argue that the justices’ response to the public should be 
stronger, as the correlation seen here is moderate at best. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect of public opinion on the voting of 
Supreme Court justices. The quantitative analysis aimed to establish this correlation in the 
aggregate by running regression analysis for a large number of case votes. The qualitative 
analysis aimed to study a few cases in depth to better understand the decision-making processes 
of the justices. The first justice studied in this manner was Harry Blackmun, and his notes in the 
Library of Congress were used to study cases in which he seemed to switch from his typical 
ideological leanings to determine whether public opinion may have caused that switch in vote. 
Since he was the only justice with extensive and useful notes on particular cases, other sources 
were used to study Thurgood Marshall, a liberal justice, and Antonin Scalia, a conservative 
justice. 
 The quantitative analysis shows that there is a relationship between the mood of the 
American public and individual justice votes. With no controls or a few controls (Models 1 and 
2, respectively), this is a positive correlation, indicating that the liberalness of the public can 
sway a justice to vote in a liberal direction. However, when all of the controls are added in, this 
relationship becomes a negative one. This indicates that the controls are likely introducing a bias, 
and Model 3 is likely the least reliable of the three.  
 A similar result was seen in the justice-specific analysis. The only two correlations seen 
in Model 3 were both negative relationships, whereas Models 1 and 2 show many positive 
relationships. Since a negative relationship, indicating that justices are voting against public 
opinion, is not logical, Models 1 and 2 seem more reliable. In these models, seven justices with 
liberal Segal-Cover scores (Stanley Reed, William Douglas, Sherman Minton, Earl Warren, 
William Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Arthur Goldberg) showed a positive relationship and six 
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justices with conservative Segal-Cover scores (William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Sandra 
Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg) showed a positive 
relationship. This indicates that this effect of public mood on voting behavior is likely present 
regardless of the justices’ inherent preferences. 
 Although Models 1 and 2 seem more reliable, I wanted to look into why the only two 
justices with maximum liberalness scores (William Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall) were 
also the only two that showed a negative correlation in Model 3. The results in Table 9 show that 
there may have been a change from a negative correlation to a positive one when William 
Rehnquist became the Chief Justice, though this is uncertain because only two of the four 
correlations are statistically significant. This could indicate that these stalwart liberal justices 
began voting more in line with the public in response to the Court becoming more conservative 
and drifting away from the average ideology of the public.  
 Another justice of interest is Felix Frankfurter, the only one who showed negative 
correlations in both Models 1 and 2. He is a moderate liberal (Segal-Cover score of 0.665), but it 
appears that he tends to vote against public opinion. Perhaps this is because he is a more 
moderate justice, so tries to not be swayed by the public, and as a result, actually diverges from 
it. More research in this area could help to elucidate his voting pattern and motives. 
 In looking at the effect of polarization of the Court on all of these results, it appears that 
the justices respond less strongly to public opinion when the Court is more polarized (Table 10). 
This could be because in times of high polarization on the Court, the justices have more extreme 
ideologies of their own, and may be more likely to vote strictly along ideological lines than be 
able to be swayed by the public. In times of lower polarization, the justices are more moderate 
and may be more open to responding to public opinion. 
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 The primary purpose of the controls in Model 3 was to control for social forces in order 
to distinguish between two theories to explain the relationship between public opinion and 
justices votes, the strategic behavior explanation and the attitudinal change explanation. The 
strategic behavior explanation states that justices deliberately pay attention to public opinion to 
maintain the legitimacy of the institution in the eyes of the public, and can only be proven by 
controlling for the fact that justices are influenced by the same social forces that the public is. 
The attitudinal change explanation, which states that justices tend to vote with the public simply 
because they are subject to the same social forces as everyone else, does not require this control. 
Since the controls used in this study seemed to introduce a bias, the strategic behavior 
explanation cannot be proven. This does not necessarily mean that the attitudinal change 
explanation is correct, just that the two cannot be distinguished in this case. Many other 
researchers have commented on the difficulty of distinguishing the two quantitatively, as 
described in the Literature Review, so future research in this area could be beneficial to arrive at 
a clearer answer. 
 While the quantitative analysis was used to establish a correlation between public opinion 
and justice votes in the general sense, the goal of the qualitative analysis was to look at a 
particular subset of cases, in which one or two justices appeared to have switched from his or her 
typical ideological leanings to change the decision of a case. This was studied in order to 
determine whether the effect of public opinion was strong enough to result in this kind of switch. 
The first justice studied was Harry Blackmun, and four cases (Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, Pennsylvania Central Transportation Company v. 
New York City, and Maine v. Thiboutot) of his fit the criteria explained in the Results section. 
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 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth showed most clearly that Blackmun is influenced by 
public opinion. In this case, he voted with the liberals to strike down a Missouri law that 
restricted abortions. He has spoken extensively about this case, and its precedent, Roe v. Wade, 
and it is clear that the American public played a role in his decision. He explained that his 
experiences in the real world have, and should have, an effect on his approach as Supreme Court 
justice. He has always been a champion of women’s rights, and hired more women than any 
other justice at the time. He explained that his vote in these cases was guided by the trajectory he 
believed the country should be on: one towards expanded concepts of privacy and the 
independent rights of women. He saved many newspaper clippings, arguing for both sides of the 
case, which shows that he paid attention to what the public was thinking as these cases played 
out. 
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, Harry Blackmun voted against his fellow 
conservatives to strike down a law that provided New York state funding for religious private 
schools. Most of the notes from Blackmun on this case have to do with the amicus curiae briefs 
filed in favor of striking down the law. They argue that the law violates the Establishment Clause 
because state funding is being supplied directly to schools that support a particular religion over 
another. It is likely that these briefs influenced Blackmun’s decision, though there is no direct 
evidence pointing to a response to public opinion in this case. 
In Penn Central v. New York, Blackmun voted with the liberals in a decision that 
declared that regulations on the use of a historic landmark do not constitute a government taking. 
No specific evidence was found to indicate the extent of the role of public opinion in this case, 
though Blackmun cites amicus curiae briefs (including one by the Solicitor General) that likely 
affected his decision. In Maine v. Thiboutot, Blackmun voted with the liberals to decide that the 
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government is responsible for legal fees when a citizen goes to court arguing that they are not 
receiving their full welfare benefits. However, there were no notes in this file to indicate 
Blackmun’s decision-making process in this case. 
While the justices’ notes in the Library of Congress were not as helpful as expected in 
this study, which explains why only Blackmun’s notes were used, the study of Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth and Roe v. Wade provided an interesting case study that demonstrated 
the effect of public opinion in such a salient case. The reason this case had so much material to 
study was because of how important it was, and how much Blackmun has spoken about it. 
Presumably, if the other cases studied had had as large an impact, there may have been more 
material available to explain his decision-making process. 
To get a better sense of the decision-making of Supreme Court justices, two other justices 
were studied: Thurgood Marshall (a liberal) and Antonin Scalia (a conservative). Marshall 
clearly believes very strongly in the neutrality of the Supreme Court, and the importance of not 
being swayed by public opinion. This is evidenced by the fact that he showed no statistically 
significant correlation between public mood and his voting behavior in Models 1 or 2. Scalia, on 
the other hand, believes justices should be more in tune with the public, but they are not because 
they find themselves in a different echelon of society than the general public. However, he 
showed a positive correlation in Models 1 and 2, which indicates that he actually does respond to 
public opinion. It would be interesting to determine whether the difference between these views 
is due to one being a liberal justice and the other a conservative one, but this cannot be 
determined from this information because the sample size is too small. Additional research, with 
a larger sample size, on how the ideology of a justice is related to his or her view on this idea of 
neutrality versus paying attention to public opinion, could contribute to this understanding. 
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This research shows that public opinion has a real effect on how Supreme Court justices 
vote, which indicates that a strict reading of the law is not all that goes into a decision. This 
provides a different understanding of what the Supreme Court is: not an unbiased, robotic 
interpreter of the law, but a more fluid body that responds to real world situations as a real 
person would. Which is better is a topic for another paper, and will not be discussed here, but the 
conclusion has broad implications for the country, because the public can apparently have a real 
effect on highest judicial body in the United States.  
This paper will hopefully encourage more research on this topic. As stated earlier, the 
field would benefit greatly if a successful model to control for social forces were developed, 
because this would allow a distinction to be made between the attitudinal change and strategic 
behavior explanations. In addition, more close case studies such those presented here could add 
to the body of knowledge on decision-making processes on the Supreme Court. 
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